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What limits our response to this challenge ....9the
non-existence oía clear and generalised awareness
of the realities and dangers and the absence of
political will to fttce up to them and take corrective
act ion. Brandt Report (pp 267-8)
It is probably an accurate observation that in
conditions of uncertainty there is a preference to do
nothing. By default, if/or no other reason, it seems
probable... the Brandt Report will enter the history
books as just another well-intentioned Report that
in practical terms led to nothing. Graham Bird'
The purpose of the Brandt Report is to convey a
message... it does so effective/v and with conviction.
The intentions. . . are admirable... But the message
as a whole is not credible, because the conception
of the world on which it rests isftilse.
P. D. Henderson2
There are several mutual economic interests, (but)
these are not sufficiently compelling to... make
Western governments, including Britain 's, give North-
South relations a higher priority than they do. Two
ma/or elements are. however, missing from the
economic argument. One is some awareness of the
political as well as economic importance of having
an international o,'der o,' 'ni/es of the game'... Second
there are moral as well as economic and political
considerations... If there is a case for the British
Government to be moi'e involved in alleviating their
poverty it i's in the fï,ct instance a mo,'al one
Vincent Cable3
This friilure to understand the enormous economic
potential of less wealthy developing countries both
as markets and as suppliers is compounded by two
further misconceptions. The fIrst is to see existing
international economic and fïnancial al-rangements
as essential/v health r and adequate... The next
misconception is to pin the blame for the world's
economic malaise on OPEC.. . Edward Heath4
Kicked into Obscurity?
In the United Kingdom at least the question is no
longer whether the Brandt Report's proposals constitute
an adequate and appropriate programme for survival:
it is whether they will survive as a serious focus for
political debate and action. At the moment, Programme
for Su,'vival seems well on the way to joining its
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phenomenally ineffective and ill-timed predecessor
Pa,'tners in Development (Pearson Report) in the
obscurity of academic stacks and footnotes.
Why has this happened? On the face of it the Brandt
Report had several marks in its favour. lt was a
unanimous report of a number of statesmen and
thinkers from major First and Third World countries,
which had both a clear message and a technically (and
conceivably politically) practicable programme. That
programme was a blend of radical reformist capitalism
(on the production side) and quasi-egalitarian social
democracy (on the distribution and regulation side)a
blend that, on the face of it, has potential appeal to
both major British parties. Further, the Report uses a
'mutual interest' economic case for the rules of the
game, and it argues for the reform of the international
economic order to augment (not supplant) the moral
case for the eradication of absolute poverty.
Further, the Brandt Report is the only systematic
programme for global economic restructuring now on
the political market with any real chance of acceptance.
There is no serious conservative northern alternative.
The radical southern alternatives may be coherent
and intellectually plausible, but on the one hand they
cannot be expected to be achieved without compromise
and on the other they tend to assume that the Old
International Economic Order works well for industrial
economies, ignoring the fact that it has been overtaken
by the New International Economic Disorder.
One drawback is clear. While Programme foi-Sut-rival
does see the economic order as in growing disorder, its
authors did not in 1977-79 envisage the degree of crisis
in northern economies which has characterised 1980-
81 and made northern political leaders more inward-
looking. They are now even less willing to consider the
Commissioner's claim that improvement in North-
South relations is part of the solution' and rigid
resistance to restructuring itself part of the 'problem'.
But that alone seems inadequate to explain the very
limited practical response to Brandt even in the UK.
Nor can one argue that the Brandt Report's failure lies
in intellectual weaknessper se. Pi'ogramme for Survival
is a contribution to policy debate, not an academic
model, a sketch map for how to devise programmes,
not a blueprint. Such documents rarely succeed or fail
primarily on academic merit, and Brandt is by no
means self evidently wrong, empirically or theoretically.
Indeed, as a policy document and guide to action it
rates rather well.
Ideological Resistance
Yet it is in a related area that we find the root of the
hostility and inaction. It is ideological opposition that
has constituted the most effective barrier to action
even in the UK. (In the Third World and in socialist
Europe the basis for ideological objection is more
obvious. )6
The support and opposition for the Brandt Reportor
international structural change more generallydo
not however fit the simple division between capital
and labour (or business and unions).7 Some businesses
see profit in more trade and more aid. Those oriented
to Third World markets and those dealing in Third
World imports are examples. Inversely, firms affected
by imports favour trade restrictions and put the pressure
on Third World sources in particular because they are
seen as politically vulnerable (though calls for restrictions
against socialist Europe, Japan and the USA are
growing too). In addition, firms whose profits depend
on specialist knowledge of uncertain markets and on
frequent price changeseg commodity merchants
and brokershave vested interests in opposing
stabilisation, whatever merits it might have for producers
and consumers or in reducing the macro economic
costs associated with rapid price and balance of payments
changes.
Unions tend to take the same stance as their employers
on these issues since they affect firms, workers and
communities alike. While the running on restrictionism
is made by firms, unions are just as concerned about
'cheap imports'; and genuine general concern about
solidarity or broad mutual interest is effective in
particular union decisions only if job security is not
threatened.
The force of uncertainty
By contrast, uncertainty is a potent and unambiguous
force against implementing even the Brandt Report's
initial programme. As Bir& makes clear, there are two
elements to the matter the existence of an alternative
explanation9 of the present crisis which implies a
different cure, and the fact that the effects of any
major structural change are always uncertain and
cannot be foretold before it is implemented.
In a slightly different way Henderson' raises a number
of questions about Programme foi' Survival's implicit
analysis, in particular whether demand stimulation is
appropriate and whether the international context is
the dominant cause of the Third World's economic
problems. While no alternative model for North-
South relations emerges, the general effect, as intended,
is to stress the uncertainty of the outcome of
implementing Brandt, to cast doubt as to whether it
would be a good thing.
When resources are limited and a series of crises
confronts a Cabinet, a firm, a party or a union, there is
a tendency to avoid taking major, resource-intensive
decisions whose effects are perceived as uncertain.
This inertia can be overcome - eg, the present UK
Government's refinement and intensification of
Chancellor Healey's main policies is extremely uncertain
of outcome. This, however, requires both a belief that
a change of course is essential and intense commitment
to specific changes in the national' interest.
Few major politicians, businessmen or trade unionists
see North-South relations (beyond OPEC) as crucial
to overcoming Britain's economic crisis.'2 (Mr Heath
is an exception, as is Mrs Hart and perhaps Mr Steel;
on occasion Lord Carrington and Sir Ian Gilmour
have appeared partially convinced.) They view the
present situation as marginally unsatisfactory and
improvements as postponeable. Therefore, under
conditions of uncertainty they are not prepared to
devote substantial attention or resources to attempting
major changesa tendency heavily reinforced by the
working patterns of both private and public sector
bureaucracies which, pari passu. opt for the 'tried and
true', the relatively certain, the low risk rather than
the innovative.'3
Alternative explanations of and remedies
for the crisis
If one accepts that too much money creation in
relation to production is the main cause of current
economic problems, and that the primary remedy is to
squeeze monetary expansion, then demand reflation
is a counterproductive prescription. Broadly speaking
that is the dominant position within the present British
Government, many middle class professionals and
bureaucrats and fractions of the financial, commercial
and industrial communities.'4
A variant of this critique derives from the current IMF
analysis's which gives priority to the control of inflation,
specifically to restoring the balance between supply
and demand by cutting the latter (especially by reducing
real wages), not raising the former. However, the IMF
is concerned about the cost-push effects of under-
capacity operation, and actually favours both recycling!
transfer of international liquidity and energy price/
production management approaches which are com-
patible with the Brandt proposals. Nevertheless, in its
stress on money supply growth, demand pull and
institutional structures (labour, business practices, state
spending) as primary causes of inflation it does agree
with the monetarists that renewed growth to bring
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output up (thus equalising demand) and reducing cost
push inflation by spreading costs (higher productivity)
are unattainable.
1945-70 was clearly a 'golden age' for industrial capitalist
economies, and its restoration has immense cross-
class domestic appeal. During this period, the Third
World also had more rapid growth than before and on
average more rapid percentage growth of output than
industrial economies.' On this interpretation the Old
International Economic Order was broadly favourable
to the south, and the wide divergence of growth rates
relate largely to national action or inaction and to
inherent resource inequalities quite beyond remedy
by Brandt type proposals. In its puristKissinger in
1975or revisionistRichard Cooper in 1979form
this interpretation leads to a commitment to roll back
the post-1974 (arguably post-1970) New International
Economic Disorder by re-establishing the old order
with minor adjustments, rather than adopt A Programme
for Sun'ii'a/c structural changes.
For governments like the British committed to reducing
government intervention at home and for those who
believe that reducing government market intervention/
management is the key to greater output and efficiency,'7
extending the type of controls advocated in the Brandt
Report is hardly an attractive proposition. The Brandt
Report is frankly interventionist. While no advocate
of physical allocation by directive, its philosophy is
clearly one of managed markets with a substantial
number of structural and discretionary controls. For
example, it wishes to see business practices and anti-
cartel frameworks of the type embodied in most
capitalist industrial economies extended to cover inter-
national business relations, and believes indicative
forward planning backed by finance can assure more
stable (and larger) supplies of key commodities,
alleviating both physical bottlenecks and the costs of
rapid price swings. The alternative position is that
existing national market management works badly
enough to reduce actual production, raise costs and
promote inflation, and that globalising it à la Brandt
will have even greater costs. Business is rather more
ambivalent about thisa general dislike for state
intervention and management is usually combined
with a number of more sharply focussed demands for
particular intervention and management.
From the monetarist and anti-interventionist objections
flows another. In its simple form, it runs that if too
much money is the root of much evil, and too much
government is the root of more, then rising public
expenditure is the square root of all evil. In a more
sophisticated form the argument starts from the facts
that the UK is now a middle sized, middle income
economy with declining relativeand, recently,
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absoluteeconomic capacity, which is undergoing a
crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to sort out the domestic
crisis before the UK can reasonably be expected to
pay enhanced attention to Third World problems and,
in any event, the UK's resources and role must
increasingly be limited to and incorporated in the
EEC.
These arguments clearly carry weight with the present
government. Structural adjustment to imports can be
expensive, aid (even in the form of British exports) has
some balance of payments and budgetary costs. As
the intention is to cut the public sector draconically, it
would be surprising to see its external component
enhanced. Many businessmen, academics and trade
union constituencies recognise this conclusion, even
if they do not accept the general policy.
'Doing Well by Doing Good'?
The Brandt Report views the ethical case for assisting
in overcoming absolute poverty quite explicitly as
consistent with mutual interest, both sectorally (eg,
energy, food, freer trade) and at macro level (demand
and trade reflation to raise capacity utilisation and
real output). It does not claim that the arguments are
identical, but it does view them as reinforcing.
This approach has been criticised. It can be seen as
muddling two basically separateeven competitive-
cases and leading to mistakes on both the 'poverty
eradication' and mutual interest building fronts." It is
not self-evident that the interests of, say, Brazil, Hong
Kong or Saudi Arabia have much in common with the
anti-poverty goals of, say, Bangladesh or Tanzania.
Strong overlaps may exist in certain caseseg, India,
Indonesiabut even here what benefits local dominant
economic interests in Britain and in India and Indonesia
may or may not benefit the poor people of the two
developing countries.
Further, it is not clear that aid or mutual interest
agreements with some states are ethically sound. The
objections vary according to the world view of their
proponents, but association with many states, eg,
Angola, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Chile, Malawi, Kenya, Indonesia and
South Africa has been challenged on ethical grounds.
Finally, even if Brandt is correct, 'doing well by doing
good' as an approach may arouse such profound
suspicion as to be counterproductiveY' This particular
strand of dissent from Programme for Survival is
critical because it splits and neutralises many of the
intellectuals, middle class professionals and voluntary
organisations who in Britainhave been the most
vocal proponents of aid and of international economic
reform or restructuring.
'Farewell, a long Farewell to all my Greatness...'
There is finally a quite different type of opposition to
Brandt, rarely stated but rooted deep in the economic,
intellectual and bureaucratic establishment. This is a
profound pessimism as to Britain's ability to respond
creativelyor even to cope satisfactorilywith rapid
change. Clearly, to the extent that this perception
true or falsegoverns action, the UK will seek to
postpone, slow down and limit change without actually
causing head-on confrontation. This was precisely
broad UK strategy on international economic relations
over 1974-80 (excluding EEC entry, which was more
or less irreversibly decided before then).
This opposition to Brandt is not only influential but
logical if its premise that the UK has entered inevitable
decline and declines more rapidly under conditions of
rapid change is correct. This view is not, of course,
held by the present government, nor was it by Mr
Heath when he was Prime Minister, but it remains the
dominant establishment and perhaps the dominant
enterprise and union weltanschaung. As such it is
influential andby inertia if nothing elseas opposed
to the 'mutual interest in structural change' argument
of Programme for Survival as it was to the much more
radical 'recognition of changed realities and international
equity' argument for the original Third World NIEO
proposals of 1974-75.
Clearly no group can hold all these objections to
Programme for Survival at once. Many opponents
support only a few. The widest appeal probably lies in
the uncertainty and inherent danger of arguments for
changeeach of the others taken separately probably
has minority support individually, politically or in
terms of economic groupings.
However, because the different objections have different
constituencies the sum total is a majority of decision
takersand probably of the general publicwho are
at best agnostic and mildly opposed, and in a few cases
deeply opposed to Programme frr Survival. It is doubtful
that this is a strong consensus, or that a strong pro-
Brandt coalition (even if a minority) could not reverse
it. But there is no strong pro-Brandt coalition: its
natural supporters tend to criticise it as too unrigorous,
too much of a compromise, mixing ethics and economics.
In the absence of a cogent statement of detailed
examples, the potential economic audience for the
'overlapping interest' argument remains unconvinced.
Under such conditions a host of divergent objections
to the Report, cogently argued, can destroy its impact.
Counters to Objections to the Report
It is not the primary purpose of this essay to make the
case for Programme for Sun'it'al,2 nor to suggest what
coalition in support of it might have a substantial
impact on British policy. However, if our reasoned
summary of the objections is not to become a de facto
case for the prosecution, a note of the counter queries
to which those objections are open is required.
Uncertainty is a factor surrounding all major decisions.
If it were to be accepted as a reason for rejection, few
policy changes would ever be adopted: certainly not
the 1978-80 policies of the present government, EEC
entry, the decision to fight over Poland in 1939, the
proposed platform of Labour's National Executive
Committee, the new service forms of the Church of
England!2' The real question is whether the probable
gains outweigh the probable costs and are large enough
to justify taking a risk. Moreover, not actingie
letting things driftis equally uncertain, especially in
a context like the new international economic
disorder.
In respect of the monetarist objection several issues
are open. It is clearly open to debate whether the
record of British economic policy over 1979-81 is a
success. It is even more open to debate whether it is
actually monetarism.22 However, two additional points
can be made in the context of the Brandt Report.
First, its main thrust is not toward raising total inter-
national liquidity but on rechannelling (transferring) it
to increase output. That is not necessarily inflationary,
indeed it can reduce inflationary pressure even within
a monetarist frame of reference.
Second, the reasons usually adduced why domestic
Keynesianism is unworkable are that (especially in the
UK) demand goes into imports, creating a payments
crisis, and that institutional rigidities cause inflation
long before full capacity or full employment output.
The first critique cannot hold globally (there is no
Earth payments deficit with Mars!) and the second
very well may not. Global Keynesianism may be
practicable when the domestic British version is not
and it may even be the precondition for British domestic
Keynesianism to be practicable.
Whether the 1945-70 period was 'golden' for the Third
World is open to doubt. Per capita income rose very
slowly and absolute output divergences increased, as
did the total number of persons illiterate, hungry, sick
and in absolute poverty. In any event, reconstructing
the old order is not a serious proposition. The post-
1973 worldwhose trends are hardly favourable,
especially post-1978, to the Third World or to the
UKis its progeny. Some coherent action to halt the
rise of disorder and achieve a new, broadly agreed set
of 'rules of the game' and institutions is clearly needed.
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Anti-interventionism is in many ways a debating point.
Giving limited liability to companies is intervention.
(Adam Smith opposed it as inconsistent with the
conditions necessaty for his 'invisible hand' to operate.)
Giving government a monopoly on currency issue and
control over credit is intervention. (Professor von
Hayek opposes both most vehemently.) Providing
another £1,000 mn to British Leyland is intervention
(and most uncertain as to results).
No actual capitalist or mixed economy can operate
without substantial state intervention in market
management. The question is not a macro 'whether'
but micro 'when', 'where', 'how' and 'how much'. It is
logical to suppose that this is true internationally, and
that the present growing disorder at that level is
evidence of need for, at the least, altered forms,
policies and institutions of intervention.
The public finance implications of Programme for
Survival are not massive. The basic reflation/recycling
component is envisaged as on commercial account
and to the extent that it increased UK exports, production
and profits and decreased unemployment it would, in
fact, reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement.
The concessional finance proposals of £8,000 mn
globally might imply £300-400 mn gross for UK, less
'clawback' through reduced unemployment costs and
additional tax revenue on production, wages, prof its.24
This is not a negligible sum, neither is it a huge one in
the context of the UK budget.
If the 'muddling through' argument is taken to mean a
need to keep different cases for international change
separate, and recognise that in practice there are wide
variations in their force, complementarity and exact
nature, it is correct. But it is not evident that the
mutual interest and ethical arguments are normally
contradictoty. For example, increasing Third World
food shortages have negative implications for UK
exports and for UK domestic food prices. They also
raise ethical imperatives linked to malnutrition and
starvation. Are the two lines of argument inherently
contradictory? Is it impossible (or immoral) to use
both to construct a case stronger than either of its two
parts?2'
The 'inevitable decline' opposition to Brandt is of
course part of a much broader outlook. Is that outlook
necessarily correct? (Of course, so long as it is acted
on it is probably self fulfilling.) Does concentrating on
limiting and delaying change rather than seeking to
adjust to or capitalise on it actually reduce or increase
the costs of (benefits from) change? Why has the UK
had greater transitional and adjustment problems than
other 'mature industrial economies', eg, Netherlands,
Belgium? Is there really anything inevitable about the
causes?
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Where and What Now?
Querying the logic or intellectual force of the ideas
advanced by those individuals and groups opposing
Programme for Survival does not in itself offer any
answer to the question of what to do instead, in
modification of or in addition to the Brandt Report
proposals. There is fairly broad agreement on some of
the basic points made in the Programme for Survival:
they constitute common ground between the IMF (in
World Economic Outlook), Heath, Bird andto a
lesser extentHenderson,2 and can be summarised
as follows:
I. the present realities of international economic
relations are not satisfactory from the point of view
of 'British interests';
in the absence of new initiatives no major
improvement can reasonably be expected before
the middle of the 1980s (if then);
the structural problems of the British economy
have not been solvedindeed, high interest ¡ates
and a high pound combined with low profits have
exacerbated them for manufacturing in particular;
the substantial proportion (about 30 per cent) of
British exports sold to developing countries implies
that a significant fall in their growth rates or import
capacity could worsen Britain's export and manu-
facturing sector problems;
projecting present balance of payments trends
for Third World economies (excluding major oil
exporters) leads inexorably to the conclusion that
they will be forced to cut imports and growth unless
a structural increase in exports to industrial economies
and/or alterations to facilitate increased (or even
sustained) resource transfers (commercial and/or
concessional) can be achieved.
These do seem to imply a British interest in promoting
action at the structural level in the international economic
system and in particular, its North-South aspect,27 and
a need for concerted action through a number of
instruments in a number of sectors. If that conclusion
is correct, inaction or marginal responses to disorders
and crises are likely to prove a very poor second best.
At the present time the only coherent strategic package
of proposals which has even potential 'political saleability'
at international level is Programme for Survival. Its
opponents have not, to date, produced a comparable
monetarist (or other) alternative strategy to grapple
with the North-South aspects of the new international
economic disorder. This is intellectually and, more
important, practically, not a satisfactory situation.
It is of course not novelthe whole NIEO debate
from the early 1970s on has been characterised by the
tabling of a series of south strategy/programme package
proposals and a corresponding series of attempts at
'honest brokerage' or 'negotiated compromise' also
take into account technical, practical, political and
north interest limitations. On the North side-particularly
in the UK- the response has been to debate, delay,
raise technical queries and objections and agree to
marginal action-but neither to accept major structural
changes nor to make substantial counter-proposals.
This is a satisfactory approach only if present trends
are acceptable to the UK and are consistent with
international economic stability. Neither of these
conditions appears to be the case.
What Might be Done?
The implications for those who support and those who
oppose the Programme for Survival are rather different.
For the proponents there is a need to consider the
nature of the opposition and its arguments as a first
step in deciding whether to try and convince significant
economic and political groups that Programme for
Survival should be acted upon, or to push for a
tactically modified package,2' or to redraft,29 and how
these things should be done.
The opponents have a somewhat different obligation,
namely, to produce an alternative strategy or programme
for the resolution of the intensifying international
economic disorder and to make out a coherent case
for their ability to succeed. One such case might be
monetarist-none has yet been produced in enough
detail to qualify as a proposal for the structural reform
of the international economic system. Another might
be centred on a massive expansion of TNC activity in
the south. A third could be a demonstration that,
contrary to the 1970-81 record and almost all present
projections, the Old International Economic Order
remains basically viable and dynamic, so that 'steady
as you go' policies are adequate and appropriate.
Programme for Survival's own survival as a focus for
debate is very much in doubt, and if its opponents do
not offer any alternatives this could be the worst
outcome. Proponents of the Brandt Report should
examine the nature of the opposition to it more
carefully, and seek to counter it or to modify the
aspects of the programme which are objected to. The
opponents, for their part, should put forward their
own preferred courses of action to allow for real
debate and choice among alternative positive options.
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